World Report 2026

Source: Human Rights Watch

In 2025, Russian attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine intensified, continuing to inflict suffering on civilians and cause widespread destruction. Many of these attacks, often carried out using explosive weapons with wide-area effects and short-range drones—sometimes simultaneously—had devastating consequences for Ukraine’s civilian population and may constitute war crimes. In 2025, the number of civilian casualties resulting from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas increased by 31% compared to 2024.

According to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (UNHRMMU), from the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 through December 2025, 14,999 civilians were killed and 40,601 were injured in Ukraine.

Negotiations to end the war, initiated in February by the U.S. administration, continued throughout the year. In November, the United States presented a controversial peace agreement which, according to available data, required significant concessions from Ukraine and included provisions for amnesty for actions committed during the war, thereby jeopardizing the possibility of holding perpetrators accountable for war crimes.

  According to various estimates, as a result of the U.S. administration’s January executive order suspending “foreign assistance programs,” civil society organizations in Ukraine lost up to 75% of their funding and were forced to suspend important projects in the areas of human rights and the investigation of war crimes.

  In July, Ukraine notified the United Nations (UN) of the “suspension” of its obligations under the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, despite the fact that the Convention does not permit its suspension during an armed conflict, and this step is also not provided for by the relevant article of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which Ukraine cited to justify this decision. In 2024, Ukraine used antipersonnel mines received from the United States. Russia, which is not a party to the Convention, uses antipersonnel mines on a massive scale, with serious consequences for Ukraine’s civilian population.

The war continued to shape Ukraine’s domestic policy. Threats to media freedom, investigations into large-scale corruption, and tensions between law enforcement agencies exacerbated political instability. In July, the largest government reshuffle since the start of the full-scale invasion took place. As a result, a new prime minister was appointed and the government was reorganized. In September, the Verkhovna Rada voted to establish the Office of the Military Ombudsman to provide support to Ukrainian servicemen. In February, the Verkhovna Rada reaffirmed the constitutional provisions prohibiting the holding of presidential elections until martial law is lifted. 

Throughout the year, Russian forces continued to attack densely populated civilian areas along the front lines and across Ukraine. Many of these attacks may constitute war crimes.

In July, civilian casualties reached their highest level in the past three years: 286 people were killed and 1,388 were wounded. The high number of casualties resulted from a series of Russian attacks, including a combined missile and drone strike on Kyiv on July 31, which killed 31 people—including five children—and injured 171. Most of the casualties occurred when a Russian missile struck a residential building. It was the deadliest attack on Kyiv in terms of casualties over the past year. 

Throughout the year, Russian attacks on Izyum, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Odesa, and other cities have killed and injured civilians and damaged vital civilian infrastructure.

On September 9, Russian forces carried out a deadly airstrike on the village of Yarova in Donetsk Oblast, killing 25 civilians and wounding 19. Most of the victims were pensioners who were standing in line at a mobile post office, waiting to receive their pensions.

On November 19, a Russian missile strike on a nine-story residential building in Ternopil killed 39 people and injured 90 others. Search and rescue operations at the site of the tragedy lasted four days; many residents were buried under the rubble.

On April 4, Russian forces carried out an indiscriminate strike on a residential area in the city of Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing 20 civilians and wounding 73. During the shelling, a munition exploded in the air above a playground. Nine children were killed and several others were injured, including a three-month-old infant. This is the highest number of children killed and injured in a single shelling since the start of the full-scale invasion. The strike also damaged six educational institutions and other civilian infrastructure in the surrounding area.

From December 2024 to November 2025, at least 514 civilians were killed and 3,042 were injured as a result of attacks using short-range drones. The highest number of casualties was recorded in the city of Kherson and its outskirts. Russian drone operators used the drone’s first-person view (FPV) capability to carry out targeted attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Some drones were used to deploy prohibited anti-personnel mines and to carry out attacks using incendiary weapons in populated areas. Attacks directed against civilians constitute war crimes, and those intended to terrorize the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity.

Throughout the year, the World Health Organization (WHO) documented 577 attacks on medical facilities—more than in the previous year. Since February 2022, at least 2,665 medical facilities and personnel have been affected. From December 2024 to November 2025, the ICRC confirmed the deaths of 22 humanitarian workers and 116 emergency responders. Some of them died as a result of “double strikes”—a tactic widely used by the Russian armed forces.

Toward the end of the year, the Russian military intensified attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, causing rolling blackouts across the country. 

Russian authorities and military personnel continued to systematically torture and mistreat Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians deprived of their liberty as a result of the conflict, constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity. Many detainees are held in appalling conditions, deprived of adequate food, sanitation, and medical care. In March, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (COI) concluded that Russian authorities committed crimes against humanity in the form of torture, in accordance with a “coordinated state policy.”

Over the course of the year, more than a thousand Ukrainian servicemen and Ukrainian civilians were released as a result of prisoner exchanges. According to Ukrainian authorities, Russia continues to hold more than 8,000 Ukrainian prisoners of war and thousands of civilians.

Ukrainian authorities have handed over to Russia some of their citizens convicted of collaborating with the occupying authorities. This is a cause for concern, given the difficulty of repatriating Ukrainian civilians illegally detained in Russia.

In May, the results of an in-depth journalistic investigation were published, documenting the deaths of at least 206 Ukrainian prisoners of war in Russian detention facilities. The report provides additional evidence of Russia’s systematic use of torture against Ukrainian prisoners of war, as well as Russia’s attempts to conceal these violations and the lack of adequate medical care.

The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office reported that since February 2022, the Russian military has executed 268 Ukrainian prisoners of war without trial or investigation. From December 2024 to May 2025, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) confirmed 36 cases of executions of Ukrainian servicemen who had been taken out of action.

  In September, the OSCE released a report by the Moscow Mechanism documenting widespread violations and deliberate cruel treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war by the Russian side, indicating “systematic non-compliance” with international law. The document states that these violations may constitute war crimes and, in some cases, crimes against humanity.

In April, the body of 27-year-old Ukrainian journalist Viktoria Roshchina was returned to Ukraine. In September, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine reported that Roshchina, who went missing in Russian-occupied territory of Ukraine in 2023, had died in a pretrial detention center in the Perm Krai region of Russia. According to the results of a forensic medical examination, signs of torture were found on Roshchina’s body.

Ukrainian authorities were also implicated in the mistreatment of Russian prisoners of war. The UHRC documented cases of torture and ill-treatment of Russian prisoners of war prior to their transfer to official detention facilities, as well as beatings and verbal abuse during the registration process.

In January, a coalition of human rights organizations launched the “People Above All” campaign, appealing to all parties to the peace talks to prioritize the unconditional release of all unlawfully detained Ukrainian civilians and to make the release and repatriation of prisoners of war from both sides one of the main issues of these negotiations.

 

Russian authorities continued the forced integration of Ukraine’s occupied territories by imposing Russian legislation and administrative structures there, in violation of international law.

Russia intensified pressure on residents of the occupied territories to force them to acquire Russian citizenship. Under a presidential decree signed in March, residents of the Russian-occupied territories in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions must “regularize their legal status” by September 10, or face deportation. Under the decree, Ukrainians without Russian passports are subject to Russian residency rules applicable to foreigners and risk being forcibly deported, which could amount to a crime against humanity. At the time of writing, the consequences of this decree remained unclear.

In March, Russian authorities reported that since the start of the mass “passportization” campaign, they had issued 3.5 million passports to residents of Russian-occupied territories in eastern Ukraine. Research by civil society organizations indicates that Russian authorities used threats, the withdrawal of social benefits, and restrictions on access to healthcare, education, freedom of movement, employment, and property rights to force residents to obtain Russian passports.

  Russian authorities continued to conscript Ukrainian civilians from the occupied territories into the Russian armed forces and force them to serve in the Russian army, which constitutes a war crime under international law. In March, President Putin signed a decree launching the spring conscription campaign, which also covered the occupied territories.

Russian authorities continued to implement military-patriotic education for Ukrainian children in the occupied territories. According to available data, representatives of the occupying authorities taught Ukrainian children how to operate drones. Some children received draft notices for the Russian army a year before reaching conscription age, forcing their families to flee.

Russian authorities continued to suppress Ukrainian identity, language, and culture in the occupied territories by imposing a Russian curriculum and making Russian the sole language of instruction in schools. Restrictions on the use of popular messaging apps in Russia and the territories it occupies, imposed by the Russian government in August, further complicated access to Ukrainian online education.

In 2025, water shortages in the occupied areas, particularly in the Donetsk region, worsened due to previous damage to the water supply infrastructure. Residents of Donetsk, who received drinking water for only a few hours every three days, were forced to stand in lines at water trucks. Local residents called this situation a “humanitarian and environmental disaster.”

The occupying authorities intensified their illegal attempts to confiscate private property that they deemed “unused.” In accordance with laws passed in 2024, under which Ukrainians who left the occupied territories lose their property rights, as of November, the occupying authorities had issued notices regarding over 20,000 real estate properties in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. These regulations, which require property owners to personally appear and present a Russian passport within 30 days of receiving the notice in order to retain ownership rights, violate international law. The human rights situation in Russian-occupied Crimea remained extremely dire. The Russian occupying authorities continued to persecute members of the Crimean Tatar community who were active in civic life and other individuals critical of Russia’s actions in Crimea. According to human rights organizations, as of mid-2025, 220 people in Crimea, including more than 130 Crimean Tatars, had been subjected to politically motivated persecution.

  In September, the European Union imposed sanctions against two high-ranking officials of the Russian penal service in occupied Crimea for their involvement in the ill-treatment of detainees and the denial of medical care to them. Among those affected by such actions were, in particular, human rights defenders Iryna Danilovych and Amet Suleimanov.

Russian authorities continued to subject children in occupied Crimea to ideological indoctrination and military training, as well as to pressure and punish them for expressing pro-Ukrainian views.

  Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

As of April, at least 3.8 million Ukrainians were registered as IDPs. Most of them faced the problem of losing their income and housing. Elderly people, single parents, and people with disabilities were heavily dependent on state and humanitarian aid, which was scaled back following a reduction in funding from the United States. According to a survey conducted in April, 69% of IDPs believe that the war has negatively affected their mental health.

In 2025, several government programs were implemented to support IDPs, including monthly cash transfers, rental assistance, and a simplified mortgage lending program. The government also provided compensation to certain categories of the population for property lost in Russian-occupied territories. However, the implementation of these programs was problematic and failed to provide stable housing solutions, drawing criticism from the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights.

In April, the Verkhovna Rada passed a bill in its first reading to strengthen support for internally displaced persons, which provides for financial assistance, evacuation mechanisms, and integration into local communities. At the time of writing, the bill was under consideration.

Refugees

As of September, approximately 5.7 million Ukrainians who had fled due to the war were living abroad as refugees, with 90% of them residing in EU countries. Although their temporary protection has been extended until March 2027, some EU countries—including Poland, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Ireland—have reduced financial assistance for Ukrainian refugees and/or restricted their access to housing. In September, EU member states adopted a joint program for the phased termination of temporary protection for Ukrainians and their subsequent return and reintegration in Ukraine.

Obvious disparities in the level of social benefits compared to those provided to the local population contributed to a decline in sympathy toward Ukrainian refugees. According to the results of a survey conducted in March, Ukrainian refugees in Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Germany reported high levels of hostility from local communities.

In the United States, approximately 250,000 Ukrainians applied for temporary humanitarian stay permits under the “Unite for Ukraine” (U4U) program. In January, the program was suspended due to general immigration restrictions, which made it impossible for Ukrainian citizens to submit new applications for humanitarian stay permits in the U.S. Since the initially issued two-year permits were set to expire in 2025, many Ukrainians now risk losing their legal status, which could result in arrest or deportation.

 

Anti-corruption activists and independent media faced pressure. In mid-July, Ukrainian law enforcement officials conducted searches at the home and workplace of prominent anti-corruption activist Vitaliy Shabunin as part of an investigation into draft evasion and fraud. The searches were conducted without the necessary court warrants and were accompanied by other procedural violations. The Anti-Corruption Action Center, of which Shabunin is a co-founder, linked the searches and investigation to the center’s work exposing corruption.

In September, a Ukrainian company operating in the military technology sector pressured the English-language Ukrainian news agency Kyiv Independent, demanding a retraction of an investigative report that mentioned the company and threatening to file a complaint with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) accusing the agency of treason and aiding an aggressor state. The publication’s editorial board refused to comply with these demands.

In response to calls from civil society organizations to increase trust and accountability, in September the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine resumed live broadcasts of its sessions, which had been suspended for security reasons in February 2022.

A bill introduced to the Verkhovna Rada in September and passed in the first reading in November provides for the possibility of treating publicly disclosed information about an investigation as defamation until a court rules otherwise. Ukrainian and international human rights organizations have called on the Verkhovna Rada to refrain from adopting this bill, arguing that it would pave the way for strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) and could threaten anti-corruption investigations and press freedom.

  Despite protests from human rights and civil society organizations, a bill remains under consideration in the Verkhovna Rada that would restrict access to court rulings in cases of “special public interest” during martial law and for one year after its repeal.

  Ukrainian authorities continued to apply overly broad and vague laws on collaboration. As of November, the UHHRU found that 72 out of 950 analyzed court rulings on charges of collaboration between December 2024 and May 2025 concerned work that the occupying authorities could legally require employees to perform under international law.

In July, SBU officers conducted dozens of searches at the offices of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU). According to available information, procedural norms were violated during the searches; bureau employees were accused of “collaborating with an aggressor state” and treason. NABU condemned these actions as an attempt to exert pressure and obstruct investigations.

A new law, hastily adopted in July, restricted the independence of NABU and another key anti-corruption body—the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). The law granted the Prosecutor General expanded powers to reassign NABU cases, raising concerns about political interference in high-level corruption investigations. Despite calls to veto the bill, President Zelensky signed it the same day. After several days of mass protests in Kyiv and other cities and sharp criticism from the European Parliament, the government repealed the law, restoring the independence of both institutions.

The establishment of independent anti-corruption institutions is a key requirement for Ukraine’s integration into the EU. At the time of writing, Hungary continued to block the process of opening accession negotiations between Ukraine and the EU.

In November, Ukraine’s anti-corruption authorities brought charges against high-ranking officials for involvement in a corruption scheme in the state energy sector. Following these charges, the government dismissed two ministers implicated in the scandal. President Zelenskyy also announced the resignation of his Chief of Staff, Andriy Yermak, a few hours after anti-corruption bureau officials searched his home.

  Citing the 2024 Law on Religious Organizations, in August the State Service for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience recognized one of Ukraine’s largest religious organizations—the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC)—as an organization linked to the Russian Orthodox Church, which is banned in Ukraine. The State Service initiated a lawsuit to dissolve the Kyiv Metropolis of the UOC, which could lead to restrictions on its property rights and access to places of worship.

In July, the Verkhovna Rada passed a law on the possibility of dual citizenship, which will take effect in 2026. Human rights organizations have criticized provisions of the law that allow for the revocation of Ukrainian citizenship for individuals who “voluntarily” obtain Russian passports. Human rights advocates warned that the law’s vague wording fails to account for the widespread practice of coercion employed by Russian authorities in the occupied territories and could result in Ukrainians losing their citizenship due to being forced to obtain Russian passports under pressure. 

On January 1, Ukraine’s accession to the Rome Statute—the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court—entered into force. Upon joining the Court, Ukraine invoked Article 124 of the Statute, which allows it to limit the ICC’s jurisdiction over war crimes committed by its own citizens for a period of seven years.

  The Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine established a working group of legal experts and civil society representatives to address the reforms necessary for the full implementation of the provisions of the Rome Statute into national legislation.

In June 2025, Ukraine and the Council of Europe (CoE) concluded an agreement to establish a Special Tribunal to hold high-ranking Russian officials accountable for the crime of aggression.

  The Register of Damage Caused to Ukraine, established by the Council of Europe in 2023, provides for 14 categories of claims to document losses, injuries, and destruction caused by Russia’s military actions. At the time of writing, the registry is used primarily as a record-keeping mechanism, while compensation mechanisms and funding sources—potentially from frozen Russian assets—remain undefined. In February, Russia designated the registry as an “undesirable organization,” creating significant obstacles to the payment of compensation and potentially preventing residents of the occupied territories from filing claims and receiving compensation in the future.

In June, a law came into force that defines the concept of sexual violence in conflict situations in national legislation and provides for interim reparations. At the time of writing, the government had not adopted the necessary subordinate legislation to implement it. 

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