Russian Occupation Update, January 8, 2026
Source: ISW
Researcher: Karolina Hird
Key Takeaways
Russian officials continue to oversee the temporary deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia for cultural and educational programming. Mariupol occupation head Anton Koltsov reported on January 6 that over 100 school-aged children from occupied Mariupol are visiting St. Petersburg for the New Year’s holidays.[5] Koltsov stated that the children will tour St. Petersburg and experience a “rich educational program.” St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov met with the children and talked about Mariupol’s “recovery” under Russian occupation.[6] St. Petersburg has taken patronage over occupied Mariupol and has heavily invested in programs intended to reconstruct the city following Russia’s brutal siege in 2022 and subsequent occupation.[7] ISW continues to assess that while such programs do not constitute permanent deportation, they have an intended propagandic purpose and are thereby a tool with which Russia imposes Russian identity on Ukrainian children.[8]
Russia continues to use occupied Ukraine as a manpower resource in direct violation of international law. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Yevhen Yerin told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne Crimea on January 3 that Russian occupation authorities continue to actively mobilize Ukrainians into the Russian military.[14] Yerin noted that the mobilization system in occupied Crimea is the most robust, as Russia has been able to refine and optimize the system since 2014. Yerin stated that Russia has conducted 22 conscription cycles in Crimea since 2014, calling up 2,500 conscripts per bi-annual conscription term — totaling about 55,000 conscripts from occupied Crimea alone since 2014. Yerin also noted that Russian authorities continue broad passportization efforts in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in order to support force generation efforts and bring the mobilization system in the four occupied oblasts to a level similar to the one in occupied Crimea. Russian authorities are reportedly increasingly sending conscripts from these occupied territories to formations of the Southern Military District, including the 51st, 3rd, and 18th combined arms armies, which are deployed to various areas in eastern Ukraine.[15] While Russian law technically prohibits conscripts from participating in combat operations, Russian authorities employ a broad slate of covert measures to coerce conscripts into signing military contracts, allowing their deployment to the frontline.[16] This dynamic appears especially acute in occupied Ukraine, and Ukrainian sources have reported that one in every six prisoners of war (POWs) in Ukrainian custody are actually Ukrainian citizens from occupied areas.[17] Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying power from compelling the population it occupies to serve in its armed forces.[18]
The Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration discussed measures it took to consolidate control over communications and the information space in 2025. The Zaporizhia Oblast occupation Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media claimed on January 4 that digital television coverage reached 95 percent of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast by the end of 2025, while radio coverage reached 97 percent.[31] This means that Russian-approved and controlled television and radio broadcasts can now reach up to 97 percent of the occupied oblast, by Russian officials’ accounting. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation Minister of Digital Development Grigoriy Prokhvatilov reported that the occupation administration installed 9,000 Russkiy Mir satellite dishes, built 448 base stations, and issued over 360,000 new subscriber identification module (SIM cards) to Russian passport holders in 2025.[32] ISW has reported extensively on Russian efforts to install Russkiy Mir satellite dishes throughout occupied Ukraine in 2025 and assessed that these satellite dishes will allow Russian authorities to more tightly control the information space while cutting residents of occupied areas off from any access to non-Russian news and media sources.[33] ISW similarly assessed that Russian officials levied intense pressure on residents of occupied areas to re-register their SIM cards using Russian documentation in order to support passportization efforts and gain greater control over mobile communications networks.[34] Prokhvatilov’s claims suggest that Russian authorities have successfully issued over 360,000 Russian passports to residents of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast alone.[35]
The Russian government has developed a long-term strategy for the development of occupied areas of Ukraine adjacent to the Azov Sea that will further facilitate the forced integration of these territories and their assets into Russia. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin approved on December 31, 2025 the “Strategy for Sustainable Development of the Azov Sea region through 2040,” as well as an action plan for the strategy’s implementation.[39] The Azov Sea Development Strategy pertains to coastal areas of the Azov Sea in occupied Crimea and Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Donetsk oblasts, as well as occupied Luhansk Oblast, which does not border the Azov Sea directly. The strategy seeks to optimize development in industry, recreation, transportation infrastructure, ecology, and fishery potential.[40] The strategy also seeks to increase the population of territories adjacent to the Azov Sea to almost 9 million people, and suggests that investment in industry, transportation infrastructure, and tourism will help stimulate population growth.[41] The Azov Sea Development Strategy echoes other similar Russian plans for the development of occupied Ukraine — it calls for heavy Russian investment in occupied areas and assumes that Russian investment will allow Russia to reap substantial economic and demographic benefits from its occupation of Ukraine.[42]
Researcher: Karolina Hird
Key Takeaways
- An investigation by Ukrainian outlet Suspilne provided additional details on Russia’s deportation of Ukrainian children to a camp in North Korea.
- Russian officials continue to oversee the temporary deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia for cultural and educational programming.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to militarize Ukrainian children by exposing them to active-duty Russian servicemembers.
- Russia continues to use occupied Ukraine as a manpower resource in direct violation of international law.
- Russia’s mounting economic constraints due to the war in Ukraine are having disproportionate impacts on the well-being of Ukrainians living in occupied areas.
- Russia continues to export stolen Ukrainian grain via ports in occupied Crimea.
- Russian occupation administrators are prioritizing consolidating control over communications networks and infrastructure in occupied areas in 2026.
- The Russian-installed leadership of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) explicitly rejected US proposals for joint operation of the plant, highlighting Russian efforts to completely and irreversibly integrate the ZNPP into the Russian power grid.
- The Russian government has developed a long-term strategy for the development of occupied areas of Ukraine adjacent to the Azov Sea that will further facilitate the forced integration of these territories and their assets into Russia.
Deportation and Forcible Transfer of Ukrainian Citizens, Including Children
An investigation by Ukrainian outlet Suspilne provided additional details on Russia’s deportation of Ukrainian children to a camp in North Korea. Ukrainian human rights and legal expert Kateryna Rashevska first announced before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on December 3 that she had identified at least two Ukrainian children who Russia deported to the Songdowon International Children’s Camp in North Korea.[1] ISW assessed at the time that the presence of Ukrainian children at the Songdowon camp was likely connected to the proliferation of a Russia-North Korea youth exchange initiative, and reported that the Russian “Movement of the First” military-patriotic organization began sending groups of schoolchildren from Russia to Songdowon.[2] Suspilne’s investigation confirmed the involvement of Movement in the First in sending children to North Korea.[3] Suspilne’s investigation also confirmed that a 12-year-old boy from occupied Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast, visited Songdowon with his Movement of the First branch sometime in 2025. Occupied Donetsk Oblast-based media posted an interview with the boy in September 2025, during which he discussed the activities he participated in while at Songdowon.[4] Suspilne found that children at Songdowon cleaned monuments dedicated to North Korean leaders and were exposed to anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric. Russia and North Korea have built a robust youth exchange infrastructure in which Ukrainian children are being increasingly entangled.Russian officials continue to oversee the temporary deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia for cultural and educational programming. Mariupol occupation head Anton Koltsov reported on January 6 that over 100 school-aged children from occupied Mariupol are visiting St. Petersburg for the New Year’s holidays.[5] Koltsov stated that the children will tour St. Petersburg and experience a “rich educational program.” St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov met with the children and talked about Mariupol’s “recovery” under Russian occupation.[6] St. Petersburg has taken patronage over occupied Mariupol and has heavily invested in programs intended to reconstruct the city following Russia’s brutal siege in 2022 and subsequent occupation.[7] ISW continues to assess that while such programs do not constitute permanent deportation, they have an intended propagandic purpose and are thereby a tool with which Russia imposes Russian identity on Ukrainian children.[8]
Sociocultural Control
Nothing significant to report.Militarization of Occupied Areas
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to militarize Ukrainian children by exposing them to active-duty Russian servicemembers. The Russian MoD reported on January 2 that paratroopers of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division visited schoolchildren in occupied Donetsk City as part of New Year’s programming.[9] 76th VDV Division Deputy Commander Guards Colonel Yuri Vladimirov addressed schoolchildren and conveyed a message from Russian VDV and Dnepr Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky.[10] Footage shows schoolchildren handling small arms such as machine guns, interacting with Russian paratroopers, and trying on parachutes.[11] Schoolchildren also practiced military first aid skills and drone operation.[12] ISW has previously reported on instances of active-duty Russian servicemembers, including paratroopers of the 98th VDV Division, conducting lectures and trainings for schoolchildren throughout occupied Ukraine.[13]Russia continues to use occupied Ukraine as a manpower resource in direct violation of international law. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Yevhen Yerin told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne Crimea on January 3 that Russian occupation authorities continue to actively mobilize Ukrainians into the Russian military.[14] Yerin noted that the mobilization system in occupied Crimea is the most robust, as Russia has been able to refine and optimize the system since 2014. Yerin stated that Russia has conducted 22 conscription cycles in Crimea since 2014, calling up 2,500 conscripts per bi-annual conscription term — totaling about 55,000 conscripts from occupied Crimea alone since 2014. Yerin also noted that Russian authorities continue broad passportization efforts in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in order to support force generation efforts and bring the mobilization system in the four occupied oblasts to a level similar to the one in occupied Crimea. Russian authorities are reportedly increasingly sending conscripts from these occupied territories to formations of the Southern Military District, including the 51st, 3rd, and 18th combined arms armies, which are deployed to various areas in eastern Ukraine.[15] While Russian law technically prohibits conscripts from participating in combat operations, Russian authorities employ a broad slate of covert measures to coerce conscripts into signing military contracts, allowing their deployment to the frontline.[16] This dynamic appears especially acute in occupied Ukraine, and Ukrainian sources have reported that one in every six prisoners of war (POWs) in Ukrainian custody are actually Ukrainian citizens from occupied areas.[17] Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying power from compelling the population it occupies to serve in its armed forces.[18]
Administrative and Bureaucratic Control
Nothing significant to report.Occupation Administration Mismanagement and Internal Dynamics
Russia’s mounting economic constraints due to the war in Ukraine are having disproportionate impacts on the well-being of Ukrainians living in occupied areas. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law in November 2025 that increases Russia’s Value Added Tax (VAT) from 20 to 22 percent, which ISW assesses is intended to buttress Russian federal budget deficits caused in large part by the war in Ukraine.[19] The VAT increase is generating parallel increases in utility tariffs throughout Russia and occupied Ukraine.[20] The Ukrainian Mariupol City Council reported that the VAT increase has created a 97 percent increase in water tariffs in occupied Mariupol compared to January 1, 2025, despite Russian claims that the VAT increase would only result in a maximum utility tariff increase of 1.7 percent.[21] The Mariupol City Council noted that the massive increase in water utility costs comes against the backdrop of a severe water crisis in occupied Mariupol. Most residents only receive water for a few hours every two days. The Mariupol City Council also reported that the cost of heating has gone up almost 300 percent since 2025, which is having particularly acute effects in the colder winter months. Exorbitantly high utility costs in occupied areas are placing more of the financial burden for Russia’s war on residents of occupied Ukraine.Physical and Legal Repressions
Nothing significant to report.Economic and Financial Control
Russia continues to export stolen Ukrainian grain via ports in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian journalist Kateryna Yaresko reported on January 3 that the Russian SIBERIA bulk carrier was photographed at the port at occupied Feodosia on December 23, after turning off its automatic identification system (AIS) near the Kerch Strait on December 21.[22] Yaresko reported that as of January 3, the SIBERIA arrived at the Bosphorus Strait fully loaded, likely en route to either Syria or Lebanon. Yaresko’s report suggests that Russian authorities loaded the SIBERIA with stolen Ukrainian grain while it was docked at Feodosia and that the bulk carrier then went on to export the stolen grain to foreign markets. Yaresko previously reported that the Russian MATROS KOSHKA bulk carrier took on 27,500 tons of grain from occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts while docked at occupied Sevastopol for export to Egypt or Syria in October 2025.[23] Ukraine has sanctioned both the SIBERIA and the MATROS KOSHKA for their docking at occupied ports and their theft of Ukrainian grain, respectively.[24] ISW has reported at length on Russian efforts to seize agricultural outputs, especially grain, from occupied Ukraine and export them for profit via Ukrainian ports.[25] Ukrainian Deputy Economic Minister Taras Vysotskiy estimated that Russia stole 15 million tons of Ukrainian grain between February 2022 and August 2025.[26]Information Space Control
Russian occupation administrators are prioritizing consolidating control over communications networks and infrastructure in occupied areas in 2026. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) occupation deputy prime minister Vladimir Yezhikov told Kremlin newswire TASS on January 4 that the Donetsk Oblast occupation administration is prioritizing the improvement of communication networks in sparsely populated areas in the coming years.[27] Yezhikov claimed that the occupation administration plans to launch over 1,000 base stations (fixed transceivers that serve as a central connection hub for wireless devices) in occupied Donetsk Oblast in 2026, and that the occupation administration has implemented mobile phone coverage for over 90 percent of occupied Donetsk Oblast.[28] Yezhikov also told occupied Donetsk Oblast-based outlet Donetsk News Agency on January 4 that the DNR occupation administration is working on a project with the Russian Federal Research Institute of Radio on the development of digital television transmission throughout occupied Ukraine.[29] Television and radio broadcasting has been operating to Russian standards in occupied Donetsk Oblast since July 2023.[30] The proliferation of base stations will allow Russian authorities to exercise even greater control over communications networks and information flows in occupied Donetsk Oblast.The Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration discussed measures it took to consolidate control over communications and the information space in 2025. The Zaporizhia Oblast occupation Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media claimed on January 4 that digital television coverage reached 95 percent of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast by the end of 2025, while radio coverage reached 97 percent.[31] This means that Russian-approved and controlled television and radio broadcasts can now reach up to 97 percent of the occupied oblast, by Russian officials’ accounting. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation Minister of Digital Development Grigoriy Prokhvatilov reported that the occupation administration installed 9,000 Russkiy Mir satellite dishes, built 448 base stations, and issued over 360,000 new subscriber identification module (SIM cards) to Russian passport holders in 2025.[32] ISW has reported extensively on Russian efforts to install Russkiy Mir satellite dishes throughout occupied Ukraine in 2025 and assessed that these satellite dishes will allow Russian authorities to more tightly control the information space while cutting residents of occupied areas off from any access to non-Russian news and media sources.[33] ISW similarly assessed that Russian officials levied intense pressure on residents of occupied areas to re-register their SIM cards using Russian documentation in order to support passportization efforts and gain greater control over mobile communications networks.[34] Prokhvatilov’s claims suggest that Russian authorities have successfully issued over 360,000 Russian passports to residents of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast alone.[35]
Infrastructure and Development Projects
The Russian-installed leadership of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) explicitly rejected US proposals for joint operation of the plant, highlighting Russian efforts to completely and irreversibly integrate the ZNPP into the Russian power grid. ZNPP occupation director Yuri Chernichuk told Kremlin newswire TASS in an interview on January 5 that he “can’t imagine” any scenario in which the United States, Ukraine, and Russia jointly operate the ZNPP because the ZNPP is a “Russian facility” operating under the auspices of Russian state nuclear energy operator Rosenergoatom.[36] Chernichuk appears to be responding to the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan, which contains proposed provisions for the future operation of the ZNPP.[37] The Trump Administration has proposed a joint US-Ukrainian-Russian operation of the plant, whereas Ukraine has advocated for a joint Ukraine-US operation. Chernichuk’s statements suggest that Russia plans to reject both possible outcomes and seeks to maintain full control over the ZNPP. Chernichuk then claimed that under Russian control of the plant, the ZNPP could supply power from “Lisbon to Vladivostok.” Chernichuk confirmed that the Russian ZNPP occupation administration has received several different licenses from the Russian government to operate the plant, which will eventually allow the ZNPP to gradually transition to power generation mode. The ZNPP will reportedly have the capacity to provide power to all occupied regions of Ukraine as well as energy-deficient regions of southern Russia. ISW has recently reported that Russia’s full integration of the ZNPP into the Russian power grid is nearing completion.[38] The ZNPP’s full integration with the Russian grid will severely complicate Ukrainian reintegration efforts and is likely to preclude any Ukrainian or US involvement in the future operation of the plant.The Russian government has developed a long-term strategy for the development of occupied areas of Ukraine adjacent to the Azov Sea that will further facilitate the forced integration of these territories and their assets into Russia. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin approved on December 31, 2025 the “Strategy for Sustainable Development of the Azov Sea region through 2040,” as well as an action plan for the strategy’s implementation.[39] The Azov Sea Development Strategy pertains to coastal areas of the Azov Sea in occupied Crimea and Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Donetsk oblasts, as well as occupied Luhansk Oblast, which does not border the Azov Sea directly. The strategy seeks to optimize development in industry, recreation, transportation infrastructure, ecology, and fishery potential.[40] The strategy also seeks to increase the population of territories adjacent to the Azov Sea to almost 9 million people, and suggests that investment in industry, transportation infrastructure, and tourism will help stimulate population growth.[41] The Azov Sea Development Strategy echoes other similar Russian plans for the development of occupied Ukraine — it calls for heavy Russian investment in occupied areas and assumes that Russian investment will allow Russia to reap substantial economic and demographic benefits from its occupation of Ukraine.[42]
ENDNOTES
[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-december-11-2025/; https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/the-abduction-of-ukrainian-children-by-the-russian-federation; https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/testimony_of_kateryna_rashevska.pdf
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-december-11-2025/
[3] https://suspilne dot media/1205500-pidmitati-pamatnik-vozdam-rosia-vidpravila-hlopcika-z-makiivki-v-litnij-tabir-pivnicnoi-korei/
[4] https://dnrnews dot ru/society/2025/09/10/1174005.html
[5] https://t.me/KoltsovAnton/2326
[6] https://t.me/a_beglov/11898
[7] https://paperpaper dot io/mariupol-obeshali-vosstanovit-v-2025-m-p/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-november-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-october-9-2025/
[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/60034; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/26071139
[10] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/26071139
[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/60034
[12] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/26071139
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-october-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-october-23-2025/
[14] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1204920-u-gur-zaavili-so-krim-lidirue-za-kilkistu-prizvanih-do-rosijskoi-armii-sered-okupovanih-teritorij/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-13-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2025; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/hiding-russias-weakness/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-november-6-2025/; https://www.unian dot net/war/plen-vsu-kazhdyy-shestoy-rossiyskiy-voennoplennyy-yavlyaetsya-grazhdaninom-ukrainy-13200291.html#goog_rewarded
[18] https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.pdf
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/
[20] https://www.garant dot ru/news/1914270
[21] https://t.me/mariupolrada/31965
[22] https://www.facebook.com/kattyfun1/posts/pfbid0GpQUcRRYcHvLHAMmcahAFZvyCsV96hyuoCnKatKGFpEuVJxjz3ARVdpuUqNY9sQPl?ref=embed_post
[23] https://www.facebook.com/kattyfun1/posts/pfbid02LpavRJjLj9rKTHGrF1AW9cJ8HmbMjGQmXD3f6gjeBx8KZe1HCePWE3ptwCNvkpW3l?ref=embed_post
[24] https://war-sanctions dot gur.gov.ua/transport/ships/14; https://war-sanctions.gur dot gov.ua/en/transport/ships/301
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-october-23-2025/
[26] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russia-boosts-grain-exports-with-crops-parts-ukraine-it-controls-2025-08-06/
[27] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/26083967
[28] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/26078871
[29] https://dan-news dot ru/exclusive/dnr-s-federalnym-institutom-sdelali-proekt-razvitija-tv-v-donbasse-i-novorossii/
[30] https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/dnr-perejdet-na-cifrovoe-veschanie-po-rossijskim-standartam-s-1-ijulja/
[31] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/26088541
[32] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/26088541; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/26088067
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-14-2025/
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-october-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-3-2025/
[35] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/26088067
[36] https://tass dot ru/interviews/26074709
[37] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/24/world/europe/what-is-in-the-20-point-ukraine-peace-plan.html
[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-december-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-25-2025/
[39] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/26064631; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1065971
[40] http://council.gov dot ru/services/discussions/blogs/161752/
[41] http://council dot gov.ru/services/discussions/blogs/161752/
[42] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-december-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-november-6-2025/